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LABOR PAINS: THE EFFECT OF A WORK
STOPPAGE IN THE NFL ON ITS COACHES
ROBERT H. LATrINVILLE*
ROBERT A. BOLAND"

&

BENNETT SPEYER***

National Football League (NFL or the "League") coaches
stand to be significantly impacted by the on-going and
potentially contentious negotiations between NFL owners and
players over a new collective bargaining agreement, which
might lead to a work stoppage before the 2011 season.
I. INTRODUCTION
The NFL Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) governs the terms and
conditions of employment between the NFL owners and the NFL Players'
Association. ' The current CBA was entered into as of March 8, 2006.2 The
NFL owners have complained that its provisions are too generous to players.
In May of 2008, 3 the NFL owners exercised their rights under the CBA to
.
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1. See generally NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 20062012 (2006), availableat http://www.nflplayers.com/About-Us/CBA-Download/.
2. Jarrett Bell, NFL Owners Accept Player Union Proposal With 30-2 Vote, USATODAY.COM,
Mar. 8, 2006, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/footbal/nfl/2006-03-08-labor-x.htm.
3. NFL Owners Opt Out of CBA, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id-09000d5d80868
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notify the NFL Players Association (NFLPA) they were terminating the final
4
two League Years of the CBA that provided a salary cap (2010 and 2011).
The CBA defines a League Year as "the period from March 1 of one year
5
through and including the last day of February of the following year."
Consequently, the 2010 NFL playing season will be the last playing season
under the CBA, and during the 2010 League Year there will not be a salary
cap. 6 Pursuant to the terms of the CBA, the 2011 College Draft will be the
7
final activity under the current CBA.
The uncapped 2010 NFL League Year is now a reality. 8 In the wake of an
uncapped year, there is realistic potential for a work stoppage sometime after
March 1, 2011. 9 NFLPA Executive Director DeMaurice Smith recently
warned that, "I think it's virtually impossible to go back to a cap system if we
go to an uncapped year."' 0 Following up on that point, Executive Director
Smith predicted the likelihood of a 2011 lockout as a fourteen on a scale of
one-to-ten. I I Although DeMaurice Smith's prediction of a lockout pertains to
a negotiation tactic outside of the union's control, it nonetheless offers insight
on the NFLPA's level of confidence in smooth labor negotiations.
This Article considers the effect of a work stoppage in the NFL on its
coaches, who are non-unionized employees of the League's thirty-two clubs.
Part I introduced the circumstances that portend a work stoppage in the NFL.
Part II briefly chronicles the work stoppage history in this country's four
primary team sport leagues: Major League Baseball (MLB), the National
Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey League (NHL), and the
NFL, and discusses other financial, legal, and market considerations relevant
to an NFL work stoppage. Part III posits facts and assumptions relevant to
NFL coaches in the context of a work stoppage. Part IV surveys the clubs'
contractual treatment of coaches during a work stoppage and offers
suggestions for reaching fair and well-considered work stoppage provisions.

b78&template=without-video&confirm=true (last visited Mar. 24, 2010) [hereinafter NFL Owners].
4. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 1, at art. LVIII, § 3.
5. Id. at art. I, § 1(g).
6. NFL Owners, supra note 3. At the time of this writing, NFL owners and NFL players were
not engaged in meaningful negotiations on a new CBA with less than two weeks left in the 2009
League Year.
7. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 1, at art. XVI, § 1.
8. Steve Wyche, League, Union Continue Talking, But Uncapped Year a Near Certainty,
NFL.cOM, http://www.nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d81695a40&template=with-video-with-com
ents&confirm=true (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
9. Id.
10. Gary Mihoces, Townshend Defends Himself vs. Critics, USA TODAY, Feb. 5, 2010, at 5C.
11. Id.
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Part V proposes a future league-wide remedy to reduce or eliminate the
primary issues presented.
II. STRIKES AND LOCKOUTS IN OTHER PROFESSIONAL LEAGUES
"Lockouts occur when employers attempt to put economic pressure on
employees by refusing to allow them to work."' 2 There is no statutory right of
employers to lock out. 13 "On the other hand, the right to strike is protected
under 29 U.S.C. § 163.14 Yet, the Supreme Court, the lower federal courts,
and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) have recognized the
legitimacy of lockouts. 15 "An employer's right to lock out is reciprocal of a
union's right to strike, and necessarily encompasses the right to refrain from
16
paying during the lockout."
There are two types of lockouts:
Offensive lockouts occur when an employer locks out its
employees in order to pressure them to reach an agreement on
terms favorable to the employer... [d]efensive lockouts
occur when an employer locks out its employees to avoid
potential harm to the employer's business, property, or
goodwill that may be caused by an opportunistic strike called
at the time of a union's choosing... [w]hether offensive or
defensive, the lockout is a tried and true means for an
employer to seize the initiative in a labor dispute. 17
The fact that the NFL's CBA expired early as a result of the NFL's opt out
does not impact the owners' right to lock out the players. "In other words,
reopener bargaining and bargaining when no contract is in effect [are] on
equal footing with respect to the availability of economic weapons." 18
The history of labor relations in this country's professional sports leagues
12. Grant M. Hayden, Some Keys to the NBA Lockout, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 453, 454
(1999). For a concise discussion of the legal status of a lockout, see ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC
TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 355-62 (1976).
13. In the Matter of Nat'l Basketball Players Ass'n and Nat'l Basketball Ass'n (Lockout
Arbitration, Opinion and Award), reprinted in HOWARD L. GANZ & PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE,
UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS & LEGAL ASPECTS OF TWE SPORTS IND3USTRiY II0 (1999) [herei after In
the Matter of NBPA and NBA].
14. Id.
15. Id. at 112.
16. Id.
17. Hayden, supra note 12, at 455.
18. In the Matter of NBPA andNBA, supra note 13, at 147.
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offers important context from which to consider the likelihood, timing, and
duration of a 2011 NFL work stoppage. While the details of each labor
dispute chronicled below can be distinguished by a host of factors, at the core
of every labor dispute in professional sports is each party's perception of
economic fairness. At the heart of every recent settlement of a professional
sports labor dispute is a collective bargaining agreement with a revenue
apportionment vehicle between owners and players, and sometimes among
owners as well.
A. Major League Baseball
The advent of collective bargaining in United States professional sports
began in 1968 between the owners and players in MLB.1 9 In each of the next
eight labor negotiations between MLB and the Major League Baseball
Players' Association (MLBPA), there were eight consecutive work
stoppages.20 Baseball's eight work stoppages:

Year
1972
1973
1976
1980
1981
1985
1990
1994-95

Work Stoppage
Strike
Lockout
Lockout
Strike
Strike
Strike
Lockout
Strike

Length (Days)
14
12
17
8
50
2
32
234

Games Lost
86
0
0
0
712
0
0
912

Not surprisingly, the primary impetus for each of these work stoppages
was management's attempts to slow salary escalation. 2 1 Only three of the
eight MLB work stoppages have resulted in lost games, with the most recent
work stoppage resulting in the loss of 912 total games and the cancellation of
the World Series for the first time in ninety years. 22 The MLBPA was not the
19. Major League Baseball Players Association, History of the Major League Baseball Players
Association, MLBPLAYERS.COM, http://mlbplayers.mlb.com/pa/info/history.jsp (last visited Mar. 25,
2010).
20. Labor Pains, CNNSI.coM, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/baseballInews/2002/05/25/work_
stopppages/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
21. See id.
22. Id.
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only union with a contentious labor history with MLB's owners,
A year after the MLBPA negotiated its first CBA, the NLRB certified the
Major League Umpires Association (MLUA). 23 The MLUA was "the first
certified professional sports officials' union in America." 24 Less than a year
25
Many more
after their certification, MLUA called its first labor strike.
strikes followed over the next twenty-five years, and in 1995 MLB locked the
MLUA out of the first half of the 1995 season. 26 The lockout ended when
challenging negotiations led to a new CBA that provided, among other terms,
a no-strike clause and for the CBA's termination at the end of the 1999
season. 2 7 Renegotiating this CBA spawned perhaps the most unique and illfated attempt in sports labor law history to preempt a lockout.
During the summer of 1999, MLUA believed that MLB's reluctance to
28
So, in an
negotiate a new deal signaled its intention to lock out the union.
for
called
that
plan
a
novel
implemented
MLUA
negotiations,
effort to prompt
15,
On
July
the resignation of its members effective September 2, 1999.29
1999, fifty-seven of MLUA's sixty-eight members submitted their
resignations. 30 The MLUA hoped to leverage two hardships against MLB: (1)
the challenge of replacing entire umpire crews across the league in the last
month of the season; and (2) forcing the payment of over fifteen million
31
dollars in termination pay demanded as part of each umpire's resignation.
The resignation plan failed measurably as all fifty-seven rescinded their
resignations within a week of their submission. 32 Not only did the negotiation
ploy fail to encourage, let alone force the owners to negotiate, but also by the
33
Although most
end of July 1999, MLB had hired twenty-five new umpires.
of the resigning umpires were reinstated, the net result of the MLUA
resignation plan left "at least ten umpires permanently out of an officiating
job," nine umpires jobless for over two years, the firing of MLUA's chief

23. Frederick Alcaro, When In Doubt, Get Locked Out!: A Comparison of the 2001 Lockout of
the National Football League Referees' Association and the Failed 1999 Resignation Scheme of the
Major League Baseball Umpires'Association,5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 335, 341 (2003).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 340-41.
28. Id. at 341 (citing Peter Schmuck, Umpires Spurred by Fear of Lockout; McKean: Union's
Threat of Sept. 2 Resignation is Bid 'To Force the Issue', BALT. SUN, July 16, 1999, at D7).
29. Id.at 342.
30. Id.
31. See id.
32. Id.at 343.
33. Id.
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negotiator, 34 and the formation of a new MLB umpires' union, the World
Umpires Association. 35 MLB's acrimonious labor disputes of the 1990s have
yielded to a recent ten-plus year history without a work stoppage involving the
36
players or the umpires for the first time since the 1960s.
B. NationalBasketball Association
37
The Boston Celtics' Bob Cousy began to organize NBA players in 1954.
For the next forty years, the NBA did not experience a work stoppage. 38 The
NBA's first work stoppage began on July 1, 1995, when its owners locked out
40
the players. 39 The lockout lasted seventy-four days in the 1995 off-season.
During the lockout, NBA clubs were prohibited from negotiating or signing
contracts with free agents or recently drafted rookies. 4 1 Summer leagues and
tryouts were halted and players were not permitted in club facilities. 42 NBA
players ultimately reached an agreement with NBA owners within three days
of the players' vote against decertifying the NBPA union. 43 Labor peace
44
would not last long.
In March 1998, the NBA exercised its option to terminate the 1995 CBA
at the conclusion of the then current season. 4 5 The NBA again locked out its
players on July 1, 1998; but, unlike its previous off-season lockout, this
lockout lasted 204 days, resulting in an abbreviated fifty-game 1998-99 season

34. Id. at 344.
35. The World Umpires Association was certified by the NLRB on February 24, 2000. Barry M.
Bloom & Tom Singer, Umpires Ratify Labor Agreement, MLB.COM, Jan. 19, 2010, http://mlb.mlb.co
m/news/article.jsp?ymd=20100119&contentid=7934990&vkey=news mlb&fext=.jsp&c_id=mlb&p
artnerld=rss mlb.
36. Id.
37. Ryan T. Dryer, Beyond the Box Score: A Look at Collective BargainingAgreements in
ProfessionalSports and Their Effect on Competition, 2008 J. DiSP. RESOL. 267, 274 (2008).
38. See Marc J. Yoskowitz, A Confluence of Labor and Antitrust Law: The Possibility of Union
Decertification in the National Basketball Association to Avoid the Bounds of Labor Law and Move
Into the Realm ofAntitrust, 1998 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 579, 607 (1998).
39. NBA Locks Out Players First Work Stoppage in League History; No Talks Scheduled,
SEATTLE TIMES, July 1, 1995, at B 1 [hereinafter NBA Locks Out Players].
40. See NBA Lockout Chronology, CNNSI.COM, Jan. 6, 1999, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/bas
ketballlnbanewst99910 1105/lockoutchroGnoogy/.
41. NBA Locks Out Players,supra note 39.
42. Id.
43. Robert Bradley, Labor PainsNothing New to the NBA, APBR.ORG, http://www.apbr.org/labo
r.html (last visited Mar. 29, 2010).
44. See NBA Lockout Chronology, supra note 40.
45. Id.
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and the cancellation of that season's popular NBA All-Star game. 4 6 As
before, NBA clubs were barred from making player transactions and holding
workouts. 47 Notably, during the lockout the players brought a grievance
48
seeking payments pursuant to guarantee provisions in their contracts.
Specifically, the grievance arbitration found "that the non-payment of wages
or salaries for work withheld during a lawful lockout to be a component of the
right to lock out." 49

Thus, the NBA clubs had no obligation to make

payments on guarantee clauses when the players' contracts extended beyond
the term of the CBA and where such contracts were silent on the subject of
lockouts. 50

Currently, the NBA has to decide by December 15, 2010, whether to
extend the current CBA through the 2011-12 season. 51 Without an extension,
the NBA's current CBA expires on June 30, 2011.52 Recently, Sacramento
Kings Guard Bobby Jackson publicized the importance of re-educating work
stoppage neophytes about the NBA's most recent labor pains-a lockout that
happened during an economic boom. 53 Jackson's warning probably captures
the concern of many professional players and owners across the NBA, as well
as MLB, the NHL, and the NFL regarding the potential costs of a protracted
work stoppage in a fragile economy.
C. National Hockey League
There have been three work stoppages in the National Hockey League: a
ten-day in-season strike in 1992 and two lockouts. 54 The first lockout began
during the 1994-95 season and caused the loss of thirty-six regular season
games. 5 5 The 2004-05 lockout, which began the first day of the NHL League
Year, lasted a few months short of a calendar year and caused the loss of the
46. Steve Aschburner, Lockout Revisited, 10 Years Later, CNNSI.COM, July 8, 2008,
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2008/writers/steve-aschburner/07/08/1ockout.revisited/index.htm.
47. Mike Wise, BASKETBALL; It's Their Ball, and N.B.A. Owners Call for Lockout,
NYTIMES.COM, June 30, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/06/30/sports/basketball-it-s-their-balland-nba-owners-call-for-lockout.html.
48. In the Matter ofNBPA and NBA, supra note 13, at 91.
49. Id. at 145.
50. Id. at 157-59.
St.

NBA, Players Union Hold First Talks Regarding New CBA, SPORTSBUSINESSDAILY.COM,

Aug. 5, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/132289.
52. Id.
53. Chris Tomasson, Second Lockout Could Be On Horizon, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 23,
2009, at 6.
54. Paul D. Staudohar, The Hockey Lockout of 2004-05, 128 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 23,24 (2005).
55. Id.
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entire 2004-05 season. 56 The 2004-05 lockout is notable not only for its
duration as the longest lockout in United States sports history, but also because
it is the most recent lockout in professional sports and was choreographed by
57
Bob Batterman, the attorney recently retained as labor counsel to the NFL.
Another striking similarity between the NHL and NFL is the NFL's claimcopiously challenged-that each NFL club lost money in 2009.58 For those
NFL clubs that have experienced a substantial reduction in profits, let alone
operating losses, a lockout that reduces the club's primary operating expense
becomes a most attractive negotiating strategy. For those clubs that operate
with bold margins, the opportunity costs of a lockout may not only stimulate
cooperation with the players, but also among other owners in the form of
revenue sharing.
D. NationalFootballLeague
The NFL currently enjoys the longest period of labor peace between
players and owners among our country's four major professional team
sports. 5 9 But the environment of the NFL's impending labor disputes
resembles the NFL's prior labor squabbles in at least one critically important
respect-there will, beginning in 2010, be no existing framework for sharing
the NFL's revenues between the owners and players and among the owners
themselves after 2011.60
"The NFL has had three strikes in its history." 6 1 The NFL's first strike
occurred in the 1974 preseason and lasted for forty-one days without the loss

56. Id.at 23.
57. Brian Baxter, Proskauer's Bob Batterman Signals a Labor War in the NFL,
AMLAWDAILY.COM, May 21, 2008, http://amlawdaily.typepad.com/amlawdaily/2008/05/smashmout
h----p.html.
58. Scott Brown & Carl Prine, Union Chief: NFL Headedfor Lockout, PITTSBURGH TRIB., Aug.
19, 2009, available at http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/sports/steelers/print 638933.
html.
59. Jarret Bell, Lockout, Labor War Loom Over NFL as Uncapped 2010 Begins,
USATODAY.COM, Mar. 3, 2010, http://www.usatoday.com/sports/football/nfl/2010-03-02-lockoutlabor-war-loom-over-nfl-uncappedN.htm. The NFL adopted its salary cap system as part of the
settlement of various NFL players' antitrust class action lawsuits. The League's salary cap system
has been the foundation for extending the CBA without a work stoppage sirnce 1993. AARON N.
WISE & BRUCE S. MEYER, INTERNATIONAL SPORTS LAW AND BUSINESS 103-04 (1997).
60. NFL to Cut $100 Million Annual Revenue-Sharing Program,NFL.CoM, http://www.nfl.com/
news/story?id=09000d5d8l4beaO4&template-with-video-with-comments&confirm--irue (last visited
Mar. 29, 2010).
61. A Strike vs. A Lockout, NFLPA.COM, http://www.nflplayers.com/Articles/CBANews/AStrike-vs-A-Lockout (last visited March 2, 2010).
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of a regular season game. 62 In 1982, the NFL players went on strike for fiftyseven days, and the League played an abbreviated nine-game regular season. 63
The NFL's 1987 strike was also an in-season work stoppage that lasted
twenty-four days and resulted in the cancellation of the games scheduled for
the third week of the season and the next three week's games being played by
replacement players. 64
While the NFL's players have never experienced a lockout, NFL owners
have recent experience with a lockout. After almost six months of
unsuccessful off-season negotiations between the NFL and its officials, the
National Football League Referees' Association (NFLRA), the NFL locked
out its officials. 65 Replacement officials from the ranks of college football,
the Arena League, and NFL Europe called the final 2001 preseason games and
the game on September 9, 2001, "season openers." 66 Two days later, the
September 11, 2001 tragedy shook the country, providing the NFLRA with a
new appreciation for the importance of returning to work. 67 Consequently, on
September 19, twenty-two days into the lockout, the NFLRA accepted what
amounted to the NFL's most recent offer, and the lockout ended. 6 8 While the
impact of the 9/11 tragedy on the NFLRA's decision to accept the NFL's offer
cannot be understated, history will recognize that this lockout ended favorably
for NFL owners.
E.

Other Relevant Considerations

1. Market Factors.
A host of financial, legal, and market conditions wilt influence the
League's labor negotiations; some marry the interests of clubs and players,
others encourage their divide.
a. War Chests
NFL team owners receive guaranteed revenue every year. 69 In 2009, each
62. Id.
63. Dennis Coates & Brad R. Humphreys, The Economic Consequences of Professional Sports
Strikes and Lockouts, 67 S. ECON. J. 737, 738 (2001).
64. Id.
65. Alcaro, supra note 23, at 338-40.
66. Id. at 339-40.
67. Edward Wong, N.F.L. Officials Approve Pact and Will Be Back Sunday, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 2001, at D4.
68. Alcaro, supra note 23, at 340.
69. Interview with Michael Cramer, former president, chief operating officer, and minority
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team owner collected approximately $125 million in guaranteed revenue from

all sources (i.e. media and properties).

70

A significant portion of that money

came from the NFL's contracts with DIRECTV, which runs from 2011-2014,

and pays each team about $30 million a year, regardless of if there is a work
stoppage. 7 1

NFLPA

Chief DeMaurice

Smith estimated the aggregate

broadcast revenue for the League in 2011 at $5 billion, even if no games are
played in that season. 72 Similarly, the League's recently extended broadcast
contracts with CBS and Fox include provisions that the League will be paid by
73
these networks even if no games are played because of a lockout.
The NFLPA is also building its own war chest. The NFL player
representatives voted in September 2009 to authorize the NFLPA to divert all

royalty payments from its marketing division, NFL Players, into a fund that
the NFLPA hopes will amount to approximately $60,000 per player in 2011.74

Another component of those funds is attributable to increasing players' union
dues from $10,000 to $15,000 in the 2009 and 2010 seasons. 75 The NFLPA
has further suggested to its players to save twenty-five percent of their take
home pay for their personal lockout fund. 76 Approximately one year ago, at
the end of February 2009, the NFLPA's investments stood at nearly $147
million, after a reported $13.5 million loss in the NFLPA's fiscal year ending
February 28, 2009. 77 A war of attrition heavily favors the NFL owners, but
NFL Commissioner Roger Goodell has publicly refuted the union's belief that
the owners are aiming for a lockout. "You [do not] make money by shutting

owner of MLB's Texas Rangers and the NHL's Dallas Stars and New York University Professor and
expert in professional franchises (Mar. 6, 2010).
70. Id.
71. See Matthew Futterman, NFL, DirecTV Extend Pact in $4 Billion Deal, WALL ST. J., Mar.
24, 2009, at B5.
72. NFLPA Head Smith Believes Team Owners PreparingFor Lockout, NFL.COM, http://www.
nfl.com/news/story?id=09000d5d81634978&template=with-video-with-comments&confirm=true
(last visited Mar. 29, 2010) [hereinafter NFLPA Head Smith Believes].
73. Judy Battista, TV Deal Bolsters League's Lockout Chest, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 2009, at B19.
It has been reported that the Fox and CBS extensions averaged $712 million and $622 million,
respectively per year, with these networks receiving credit towards future year's payment for
payments made during a lockout. Id.
74. NFLPA Votes to Start Fundfor '11 In Case of Lockout or Strike, SPORTSBUSINESSDAILY.
COM, Sept. 14, 2009, http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/1 33277.
75. Jon Saraceno, NFLPA Building Lockout War Chest by Increasing Player Dues by 50%,
USATODAY.COM, Sept. 22, 2009, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/thehuddle/post/2009/
09/nflpa-building-lockout-war-chest-by-increasing-player-dues-by-50/1.
76. Mike Wilkening, NFLPA 's Smith: Lockout Looming in 2011, PROFOOTBALLWEEKLY.COM,
Feb. 4, 2010, http://www.profootballweekly.com/2OlO/02/04/nflpas-smith-lockout-looming-in-201 1.
77. Daniel Kaplan, NFLPA Paid Upshaw's Estate $16M Out of Trust, STREET & SMITH'S
SPORTS Bus. J., Feb. 1, 2010, at 33.
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78
down your business," Goodell announced.

b. Short Careers
Playing careers in professional team sports are short. In fact, NFL
players' careers are the shortest among their counterparts in MLB, the NBA,
and the NHL. Average Player Career Length:

Major League Baseball

5.6 years 79

National Hockey League

5.5 years 80

National Basketball Association

4.8 years 8 '

National Football League

3.5 years 82

Short careers heighten the importance of avoiding or limiting a work stoppage,
particularly from the players' perspective.
c. Replacement PlayersAre Not a Viable Solution.
Professional athletes are some of the highest-skilled workers in the world.
They possess natural physical abilities, honed by years of practice, which
cannot be easily duplicated with mere hard work or good fortune. Owners of
professional sports franchises, even when faced with the revenue losses that
may accompany a strike or lockout, rarely consider using temporary or
permanent replacements.
78. NFLPA Head Smith Believes, supra note 72. That axiom will undoubtedly serve as a
constant reminder to management, as well as the players, of the benefits of cooperation irrespective of
the funding behind their ostensibly irreconcilable convictions.
79. Sam Roberts, Just How Long Does the Average Baseball CareerLast?, NYTIMES.COM, July
15, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/15/sports/baseball/15careers.html.
80. NHL Career Length Distribution (Seasons) Between 1917-18- 2003-04, QUANTHOCKEY.
COM, http://www.quanthockey.com/Distributions/CareerLengthSeasons.php (last visited Mar. 30,
2010).
81. Harriet Barovick et al., Notebook: Jan. 18, 1999, TIME.COM, http://www.time.com/time/mag
azine/article/0,9171,990035,00.html.
82. NFL Hopeful Frequently Asked Questions, NFLPA.COM, http://www.nflplayers.com/Aboutus/FAQs/NFL-Hopeful-FAQs/ (last visited Mar. 30, 2010).
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There is no evidence that the owners in the most recent NBA lockout ever
seriously considered using replacements. 83 "During the Major League
Baseball strike in 1994, some of the owners embarrassed themselves by toying
with the idea of continuing the season using replacement players[,] '' 84 and
although replacement players were used for three games during the 1987 NFL
strike, this tactic was largely unsuccessful. 85 Professional athletes operate in
an essentially closed labor market, giving them a tremendous negotiating
advantage over their unionized counterparts in other occupations. 86
2. Unionization of NFL Coaches Is Unlikely.
Unlike the players, coaches in the NFL are not part of a union. 87 In 1996,
NFL coaches formed an association (Coaches Association), which allowed
them to compile coaches' salary data, creating a powerful bargaining tool for
coaches during salary deliberations. 88 Larry Keenan, a former NFL assistant
coach, is the head of the Coaches Association and functions as the single voice
for his members. 89 However, because the coaches are not part of a union, they
do not maintain a strike fund to ease the impact of a possible work stoppage.
Yielding the question, at a time when a work stoppage is seemingly inevitable,
could the NFL coaches create a union?
Due to their positions and duties within an NFL team, coaches may be
legally unable to unionize. "Supervisors and managerial employees are
excluded from the categories of employees entitled to the benefits of collective
bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act." 90 An employer found to
91
be a supervisor cannot unionize other supervisors.
[The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)] requires the
resolution of three questions; and each must be answered in
the affirmative if an employee is to be deemed a supervisor.
First, does the employee have authority to engage in 1 of the
83.
84.
TIMES,
85.

Hayden, supra note 12, at 462.
See Steven Greenhouse, Power Bargaining;Walking the Picket Line in Gucci Loafers, N.Y.
Nov. 22, 1998, § 4, at 4.
Hayden, supra note 12 at 462.

86. Id.
87. Liz Mullen, NFL Labor Fears Affect Deals for Execs, Coaches, STREET & SMITH'S SPORTS
BUS. J., Sept. 21, 2009, at 1.
88. NFL Coaches Association, Coaches Use Salary Survey to Negotiate Contracts,
NFLCOACHES.COM, Sept. 22, 2008, http://www.nflcoaches.com/.
89. Id.
90. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 674 (1980).
91. NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. 511 U.S. 571, 573-74 (1994).
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12 listed activities [in 29 U.S.C. § 152(11)]? Second, does the
exercise of that authority require "the use of independent
judgment"? Third, does the employee hold the authority "in
92
the interest of the employer"?
It is necessary for coaches to examine whether they satisfy the three
requirements outlined by the NLRB. While head coaches have been deemed
in the past to be supervisory in nature, therefore making it impossible for them
93
to collectively bargain, assistant coaches fall into more of a gray area.
Assistant coaches engage in fewer of the activities outlined in 29 U.S.C. §
152(11) than head coaches. 94 Assistant coaches' input matters in many
decisions concerning suspension, recall, discharge, assignment, reward, and
discipline, but unlike the head coach, they do not have the final say. 95 The
second requirement-use of independent judgment-is a little less clear.
Offensive and defensive coordinators may determine the players and
formations for particular plays, but the head coach ultimately still retains
oversight. The third requirement, "in the interest of the employer," is even
less clear than the second. Assistant coaches could argue that they are
working in the interest of the players and themselves. However, the court, like
in NLRB v. Health Care & Retirement Corp., could rule that the interest of the
disputed supervisors was also the interest of the employer, therefore nullifying
their union. 96
Regardless, with a potential work stoppage in sight, and the NFL now
allowing teams to opt out of their pension plans, assistant coaches might
benefit from trying to form a union. 97 Nine teams have already opted out of
the NFL's pension plan: Dallas, New England, Atlanta, Jacksonville, New
Orleans, Buffalo, Arizona, and San Francisco. 98 The ambiguity of whether
assistant coaches can unionize and the status of their pension plans with teams
92. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (2010).
93. See generally Robert H. Lattinville & Robert A. Boland, Coaching in the National Football
League: A Market Survey and Legal Review, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 109 (2006).
94. See id. at 113-14.
95. Id.
96. Health Care & Ret. Corp., 511 U.S. at 576-81.
97. Judy Battista, Teams Leaving NFL 's Pension Plan, Angering Assistants, N.Y. TIMES, May
13, 2009, at B 16.
98. John McClain, Texans to Keep Gibbs Despite Dispute: 9 NFL Teams Anger assistants by
Opting Out of PensionPlan, HOUSTON CfIRON., May 8, 2009, at 8. In the past, coaches could qualify
for pension by serving fifteen years in the NFL. Id. When a coach turned sixty-five the pension plan
could be taken. Id. The NFL's decision to allow teams to opt out and form their own pension plans is
the product of a recessive economy, with teams believing they can cut cost by creating their own
pension plan. Id.
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may cause assistant coaches to attempt to unionize. Unionization could
guarantee their future benefits and provide protection in the event of a work
stoppage.
Unionization might be an effective alternative as a common benefits and
retirement plan manager for NFL Coaches. However, few employers are truly
ever happy about extending collective bargaining benefits to more employees,
as union members. In professional sports, unions often provide antitrust
immunity in exchange for the influence achieved through collective
bargaining. 99 It is not clear, short of teams wanting to impose a strict wage
scale on coaches via collective bargaining, what the NFL would gain by not
vigorously pursuing the disqualification of coaches as supervisory or
managerial personnel before the NLRB, if there was an attempt at
unionization.1 00 Similarly, prevailing wages in the coaching market are set
from the top down, with high profile coaches such as the newly hired Mike
Shanahan in Washington, D.C., and Pete Carroll in Seattle, Washington, along
with Super Bowl Champions like Bill Belichick, currently commanding the
top salaries.'10 In turn, compensation for head coaches impacts the salaries
offensive and defensive coordinators can demand and expect to receive, since
sometimes coordinator salaries are used to influence a coordinator from
pursuing head coaching opportunities. 102 So, even if a certain strata of NFL
coaches might qualify to form a union, the practical impact of such a unionbeyond being a benefits provider-might be negligible at best. Moreover if
NFL owners were provided antitrust protection via collective bargaining to
impose a wage scale or salary cap on coaching salaries, unionization might
have a negative impact on the coaching market.

99. See MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND REGULATION: CASES, MATERIALS, AND
PROBLEMS 437-39 (2d ed. 2009).
100. Lattinville & Boland, supra note 93, at 114.
101. Id. at 114-15. (quoting NFL commentator Pat Kirwan, who suggested that unionization
might be disadvantageous, causing coaches to lose much of the salary leverage they now enjoy); see
also Tom Van Riper, The Highest PaidCoaches; Despite the Recession, Life is Goodfor Many Head
Coaches- Especially in the NBA, FORBES.COM, May 14, 2009, http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/13/
highest-paid-coaches-business-sports-nba.html.
102. See Cowboys Make Garrett Highest-Paid Assistant in NFL, ESPN.COM, Jan. 17, 2008,
The story reports on the Dallas Cowboys
http://sports.espn.go.comL/nfl/news/story?id=3200822.
raising offensive coordinator Jason Garrett's salary to $3 million annually, to retain him as an
assistant, when it appeared likely that Garrett would accept the head coaching position in either
Atlanta or Baltimore. Id.
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3. A Note Regarding the American Needle Case and Current Collective
Bargaining Precedent.
During the 1960s, the NFL set up NFL Properties as a marketing entity to
promote the professional football brand. 10 3 Licensees would obtain licenses
to reproduce the NFL's marks on various forms of apparel. 10 4 The NFL
saturated the market by allowing many different vendors to produce caps
featuring their symbols; one of these vendors was American Needle. 105 In
2000, after American Needle had produced NFL caps for twenty years, the
NFL decided to discontinue any other licensing agreements for caps except
with Reebok. 10 6 American Needle later sued Reebok, the NFL, NFL
Properties, and all of the clubs, claiming a violation of the Sherman Antitrust
Act. 107
The timing of American Needle v. National Football League could
challenge the NFLPA and its negotiations with the NFL over a new CBA.
American Needle will determine if the NFL is a single entity, as it alleges, or
thirty-two independent franchises that must collude to provide their football
product. 10 8 Currently, every sports league consists of independent franchises
that need an antitrust exemption to conduct everyday activities such as game
scheduling, size of rosters, and minimum pay. 109 If the NFL did not have the
labor exemption, the majority of their actions would be a violation of Section
1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act: "Every contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal." 110 The
medium through which the NFL derives much of its immunity from antitrust is
through its role in the CBA;
its CBA. III The NFLPA provides that immunity
1 12
without the CBA the NFL could not exist.

103. Lyle Denniston, Pro Sports and Antitrust: Argument Preview, SCOTUSBLOG.COM, Jan. 12,
2010, http://www.scotusblog.com/2010/01/pro-sports-and-antitrust-argument-preview/.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Robert Boland, Oral Arguments Begin in American Needle vs. NFL, NATtONxLFOOTB&LL
POST.COM, Jan. 13, 2010, http://www.nationalfootballpost.com/Oral-arguments-begin-in-AmericanNeedle-vs-NFL.html.
109. Id.
110. Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
111. Boland, supra note 108.
112. Id.
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In the district court and in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, American
Needle lost. 3 Both courts found that the NFL is a single entity and therefore,
cannot violate the Sherman Act. 114 The Supreme Court heard oral arguments
on January 13, 2010, and could come back with a decision which determines
where the NFL is a single entity and where it is not.1 15 If the Supreme Court
renders a vague or broad decision in favor of the NFL, the position of the NFL
could be strengthened and that of the NFLPA diminished, creating an uphill
battle for the NFLPA in its negotiations with the League.11 6 A decision that
lessens the importance of the need for collective bargaining or the union's
ability to decertify and use antitrust as a weapon has potential to hurt the
NFLPA's position. 117 The NFL has very little to lose as it was victorious at
the summary judgment stage, and even if the Supreme Court were to decide
strongly against them, the worst possible outcome would likely be for
118
American Needle's claims to be remanded for trial on the merits.
The chief impact a decision favorable to the NFL in the American Needle
case would have on coaches, players, and a potential lockout relates to
whether the NFLPA would maintain its ability to decertify as a union and aid
players in pursuing claims in antitrust as it did in the 1990s with McNeil v.
National Football League.119 It is interesting to note that the NFL
unsuccessfully argued that they were a single entity in the McNeil case, and
that argument was rejected by the District Court in McNeil. 120 It is the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in American Needle that has once
again emboldened the league to test its single entity arguments. 121
Prior to the 2006 CBA, which has been hailed as a great victory for the
union, the NFLPA as a union had only a modest history of success in
collective bargaining. But by decertifying and assisting players in pursuing
antitrust claims, the NFLPA gained perhaps its greatest traction against the
NFL. 122 Judge David Doty of the Federal District Court of Minnesota still
maintains oversight of labor issues in football due both to the outcome of the
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 539 F.3d 736 (7h Circ. 2130), cerl. granted,
129 S. Ct. 2859 (U.S. June 29, 2009).
119. McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
120. Id. at 878-80.
121. Am. Needle, 538 F.3d at 740, 744.
122. See Sean W.L. Alford, Dusting Off the AK-47: An Examination of NFL Players' Most
Powerful Weapon in an Antitrust Lawsuit Against the NFL, 88 N.C. L. REV. 212, 212-17 (2009).
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23
McNeil case and a consent decree from White v. NationalFootball League. 1
The NFL recently moved to have Doty's oversight of its labor relations with
its players union arising from that consent decree entered in 1993 in the White
24
case terminated, but that action was unsuccessful. 1
If the Supreme Court were to recognize a broad application of the single
entity theory, the position the NFL is arguing for before the Court in American
Needle, the NFLPA's leverage both in collective bargaining and as the
decertified organizer of antitrust actions like McNeil would be radically
diminished. 125 In the event of a broad NFL victory in American Needle, there
would likely not be a lockout, as the NFLPA would have little leverage except
to accept the NFL's CBA offer. The impact upon coaches might be equally
dire, especially if ownership sought to level the inequities in coaching
compensation with a wage scale or team salary cap for coaches, which might
be permissible if the Court gave credence to the NFL's argument of complete
internal antitrust immunity. Given the low spending on coaches as compared
to player salaries, coaching compensation has been a place where high revenue
owners can gain an advantage over lower revenue teams, so it remains to be
seen whether the owners would be willing to agree to such broad
limitations. 126
Similarly, if the Supreme Court issues either a narrowly tailored decision
favoring the NFL in the American Needle case, or finds in favor of American
Needle's claims, the journey toward a lockout or work stoppage would
proceed unabated. If the NFLPA were to successfully decertify, as they did in
the McNeil case, and as provided for in the expiring CBA, there would be
some question as to whether a lockout would remain a viable option since a
range of labor law options, perhaps including the ability to lockout, would or
might not apply in the case of decertification. 127 But this would likely not
take place without significant legal wrangling, and there would seem to be a
reasonable question as to whether the remedy of a28lockout could survive the
termination of a collective bargaining relationship. 1

Another possibility, especially in the absence of changed precedent from a

123. White v. Nat'l Football League, 585 F.3d 1129, 1136-38 (8th Cir. 2009).
124. Id. at 1138.
125. See Bolandsupra note 108.
126. See Lattinville & Boland, supra note 93, at 125 (quoting former NFL executive and
commentator Pat Kirwan saying that "if the owner really wants to make a difference, the one place he

can do it is by spending more money on his coaching staff'). Kirwan's comments come during a time
when a salary cap was in place but remain relevant when one considers how much influence coaches
have and how small their combined salaries are compared to player salaries.
127. See Alford, supra note 122, at 246-47.
128. Id.
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decision in American Needle, and one far less dire for coaches, is that the
league simply bargains to impasse with the NFLPA this year and uses the
impasse to impose work rules on its players. 12 9 There would be no work
stoppage and the dispute between the league and its players could continue in
court for years to come. This would parallel the relationship between the
League and players in the early 1990s, which was legally contentious and
culminated in the players' victory in McNeil. 130 In this environment, the
existing relationship between coaches and their teams would not likely change
with their respective teams. But the continuing specter of a work stoppage
would also likely keep a variety of unfavorable work stoppage clauses in
coaching contracts throughout the period; such language is discussed in
greater detail in Part IV.
III. A WORK STOPPAGE: FACTS AND ASSUMPTIONS
A. Timing of a Lockout
One of the critical elements as to the preparedness of NFL coaches for any
potential lockout is when such a lockout might occur. The approach the NBA
took in 1994, led by Commissioner David Stern, himself a former labor
attorney at the firm of Proskauer Rose, has served as the model for other
leagues seeking to conduct an offensive lockout. 131 Stem's and the NBA's
lockout strategy was aided by success in two proceedings. 132 The first victory
took place in relation to an NLRB grievance which was filed by the players
union and subsequently withdrawn without any of its claims for relief having
been granted; including a claim for an injunction alleging that an off-season
lockout was illegal because the players were not working at the time. 133 The
second was a victory in a grievance that found that the existence of guaranteed
contracts did not require players to be paid during a lockout. 134 The NHL
followed a similar path during its lockout, which cost the NHL an entire
season in 2004-05.135 It is hardly a coincidence that the NFL has engaged

129. See Michael J. Cramer & James M. Swiatko, Did Major League BaseballBalk? Why Didn't
MLB Bargain to Impasse and Impose Stricter Drug Testing Standardsfor Performance Enhancing
Substances?, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 29 at 48-49 (2006) (discussing the history of the imposition

of impasse rules in professional sports).
130. See generally McNeil v. Nat'l Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn. 1992).
131. See Hayden, supra note 12, at 455.
132. Id. at 456-57.

133. Id.
134. Id. at 456-57.
135. Staudohar, supra note 54, at 23.
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current Proskauer partner Bob Batterman as labor counsel. Mr. Batterman is
lockout strategy along
regarded by many as the co-architect of the offensive
136
Stern.
Mr.
colleague,
with his former Proskauer
But there are some critical practical differences between those offensive
lockouts and a potential NFL lockout, and the most striking difference is that
the NFL League Year ends and the expiration of its CBA comes fairly close
after the conclusion of the 2011 NFL season. 137 The NFL players should still
be in reasonably good financial shape from the regular season, when players
are commonly paid the bulk of their contract compensation in weekly checks.
The expiration of the NBA League Year in 1994, prior to its lock out, took
138
place in June-almost three months after the end of the regular season.
When the grievance filed by the union on behalf of over two hundred players
seeking to be paid their guaranteed salaries, despite the lockout, was denied,
the NBA players were several months removed from any compensation and
agreeing to a CBA favorable to ownership became the only realistic prospect
for the players of getting paid. 13 9 If an NFL lockout were to begin as early as
March 1, 2012, at the expiration of the CBA, it could provide some small
advantage to the players. The NFL players would in most cases be only a
month removed from their last game check and would have more than a full
year's warning that a lockout might take place.
Additionally, NFL compensation is paid rather differently than NHL or
NBA compensation, which largely consists of guaranteed contracts paid
during the playing year. 140 More veteran NFL players and highly drafted
players are often compensated through a variety of bonuses, which pay at
more irregular intervals around the calendar year. 141 These bonuses take the
place of guaranteed contracts in the sport. Former Oakland Raiders executive
Michael Lombardi said that most of his players who had bonuses had roster
bonuses that paid out on the fifth day of the League Year. 142 This fact would

136. Baxter, supranote 57.
137. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 1, at art. 1, § 1(g).
138. NBA Labor History, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Aug. 8, 1995, at 94.
139. Hayden, supra note 12, at 456-57 cf Mike Wise, Pro Basketball; When Millionaires are
Laid Off, N.Y.T1MES.COM, Oct. 26, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/26/sports/pro-basketballwhen-millionaires-are-laid'off.html?pagewanted=1 (detailing the famous profligate spending and
expenses of NBA player Kenny Anderson, who was experiencing a cash shortage in October after not
being paid his full salary of $5.8 million dollars because of the lockout).
140. See Ed Bouchette, NFL: There's No Guarantees,Except Contract Money, PITTSBURGHPOS
T-GAZETTE.COM, Mar. 31, 2002, http://www.post-gazette.com/sports/notebooks/20 02033 lnflnot3.as

p.
141. See id.
142.

Interview with Michael Lombardi, former Oakland Raider executive (Feb. 11, 2010).

354

MARQUETTE SPORTS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:2

seem to favor the lockout beginning in March as the teams would have the
ability to avoid paying lucrative roster bonuses during the lockout.
However, it is also common for NFL players to have bonuses tied to
participation in the team's off-season training program. Former Green Bay
Packers vice president and current University of Pennsylvania lecturer,
Andrew Brandt, said such workout bonuses were common and usually
predicated on the completion of eighty-five percent of the team's off-season
conditioning sessions. 14 3 One last key piece of data to consider in
ascertaining the likely timing of a lockout is that the last activity contemplated
by the expiring CBA is the 2011 player draft, an event that in recent history
takes place in late April. 144 With the draft going forward under the CBA and
serving as a major television and promotional event for the league, 145 it is
doubtful that even in the face of a looming work stoppage that the NFL would
not take advantage of this publicity and potential revenue. With conditioning
bonuses pending too, there are multiple reasons to believe that a lockout might
not occur until as late as May or June. Locking out in this time frame would
preserve the draft as a major off-season event and allow the owners to avoid
having to pay workout bonuses or perhaps draft picks, while still retaining the
rights to their players.
The foregoing facts may shed some light as to the timing of a potential
lockout. In an offensive lockout, which is at least what the NFL seems to be
convincing the players that it intends to do, it is practically advantageous to do
so at a time when the players are at their collective financially poorest
moment. 146 This would indicate that there might not be an immediate lockout
at the end of the League Year, as the players are not far removed from their
last paycheck in January when the League Year expires in early March. The
fact that the NFL Draft is both a key League activity as well as a revenue and
attention producer for the League, it is unlikely that a lockout would take place
prior to the 2011 draft, which is traditionally held at the end of April.
NFL owners could even open training camps in July 2011, only to lock
players out on the eve of the regular season, when players begin receiving
weekly game salaries. This kind of a late lockout would shift the burden of
the strike-lockout paradigm back to the NFLPA, which might have to decide

143. Interview with Andrew Brandt, former Green Bay Packers Vice President and current
University of Pennsylvania lecturer (Feb. 11, 2010).
144. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 1, at art. XVI, § 1.
145. See Bill Gorman, NFL Draft Viewership Up 62% Over 6 Years, TVBYTHENUMBERS.COM,
2
6
Apr. 24, 2009, http://tvbythenumbers.com/2009/04/24/nfl-draft-viewership-up-6 -over- -yearsl1735
1.
146. See Hayden, supra note 12, at 455.

WORK STOPPAGE IN THE NFL

2010]

to declare a strike themselves or report to training camp with the specter of a
lockout looming. But a late lockout would also mean that a variety of
bonuses, including rookie-signing bonuses, would have been paid by owners
to players. Therefore it is most likely that any lockout would occur, if one
were to occur, sometime after the college draft and before rookie signings or
veteran workout bonuses were due to be paid, saving clubs the largest amount
of money. This information points toward late May or early June as the most
likely date for a lockout, as the players would be reasonably far removed from
their last game checks, the draft would be preserved as an event, and the clubs
could use the lockout to avoid paying a substantial amount of bonus money.
With work stoppage language, calling for immediate pay cuts and potential
termination if a work stoppage lasts for specified periods, now appearing in
coaching contracts, 14 7 it is critical that coaches not be caught unprepared by a
surprise lockout of players. While a lockout could certainly begin as early as
the beginning of March 2011-the conclusion of the 2010 League Year and
expiration of the CBA-a later lockout seems more likely. And even if the
players are locked out in early March of 2011, there will be no shortage of
work for NFL coaches.
B. NFL Coaches' Off-Season Duties
At the conclusion of their club's playing season, NFL coaches enjoy little
free time before undertaking off-season, off-field duties that last well into the
start of the new League Year. The NFL's 2010 regular season will conclude
on Sunday, January 2, 2011, and culminates with Super Bowl XLV on
February 7, 2011.148

Twelve of thirty-two NFL teams qualify for the

playoffs. 1 So, the coaching staffs of a dozen NFL clubs will remain focused
on their in-season duties well into January, while the off-season for twenty
NFL staffs begins on January 3, 2011. Whether an NFL coaching staff is
involved in the play-offs or not, almost all NFL coaches will be traveling to
Mobile, Alabama in January to attend several days of Senior Bowl
practices. 150 Since the Senior Bowl is traditionally played in late January,
49

147. Mullen, supra note 87, at 1.
148. NFL Postseason Schedule 2009, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/schedules (last visited Apr.
1,2010).
149. See id.
150. Jason Reid, Redskins Coaches Head for Senior Bowl with NFL Draft in Mind,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Jan. 24, 2010, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/redskinsinsider/jasonreid/redskins-coaches-head-for-seni.html. The parent organization of the Senior Bowl approved a
three-year lease that will keep the Senior Bowl game at Ladd Peebles Stadium in Mobile, Alabama,
through 2012. Senior Bowl to Remain in Mobile, SENIORBOWL.COM, Oct. 8, 2009, http://seniorbow
l.corn/article.asparticlelD=166. Notably, however, the lease provides for an option to cancel the
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every NFL club but the Super Bowl participants will be focused primarily on
off-season duties within a few weeks or less of their final game."'5 Although
the specific responsibilities of a given coach vary from club to club, there are
numerous off-season duties undertaken by an NFL coaching staff that are
uniform among clubs, notwithstanding nominal differences in their
descriptions from one club to another.
The makeup of an NFL coaching staff is frequently dynamic as coaches
change positions at the end of the season. In 2008, for example, forty-two
percent of NFL coaches changed jobs.152 Depending upon the position to be
filled, many NFL coaches are interviewing other coaches or being interviewed
by NFL front offices and their current coaching staffs throughout January and
the early part of February. Those staffs with little turnover in a given year
may enjoy the advantage of tackling their off-season responsibilities sooner
and as a group.
NFL coaches are involved in two primary off-season functions that do not
involve direct interaction, on the field or off the field, with the club's current
players: (1) self-scouting or internal performance evaluations of the coach's
current pro team's personnel; and (2) prospect scouting. Prospect scouting
includes a coach's analysis of draft eligible prospects as well as free agent
prospects, including the club's own free agent prospects. Coaches frequently
dedicate their office time in the mornings to self-scouting activities and then
join members of the scouting department and front office in the afternoons and
evenings to evaluate personnel matters.
The self-scouting process lasts several months or more and includes each
coach's evaluation of the club's scheme, personnel, and decision making on
the other side of the ball from the position(s) he coaches. This analysis often
requires film study of at least half of the club's games from the immediately
prior season. Of course, the defensive coaches, for example, also evaluate
their own performance. Moreover, in conjunction with the offensive coaches'
intra-staff evaluation, each coach, each offensive and defensive staff member,
and the staff as a whole prepares a report that identifies and prioritizes the
team's on-field strengths, weaknesses, and remedial measures.
Self-scouting is somewhat of a misnomer in the sense that almost every
coach on an NFL staff is also assigned to identify and study the top categorical
performances across the League, and assess the reasons for such success. For

agreement after each year. Id.
151. See NFL PostseasonSchedule 2009, supra note 148.
152. John Crumpacker, NFL Assistant Coaches Have Pension Concerns, SFGATE.COM, May 13,
2009, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-05-13/sports/17202178_1_pension-plans-defined-benefitpension
-nfl-owners.
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example, a linebacker coach may be asked to review the NFL's top five short
yardage and two minute defenses in terms of yards and points allowed. Such
an analysis necessarily requires reviewing thousands of snaps on film and
preparing both written and oral reports to the staff as a whole identifying,
among many conclusions, (1) the relative effectiveness of a given scheme; (2)
the importance of personnel and their relative skills in such schemes; (3) the
stunts, calls, or adjustments best suited to defend the most likely offensive
schemes, personnel, and calls in that category; and (4) the coach's proposal for
improving the club's performance in the category to which the coach was
assigned. Once the background analysis is completed and the reports are
vetted among the staff, the position coach will be responsible for revising the
club's playbook for that category consistent with the staff's recommendations.
Prospect scouting is equally detail oriented and labor and time intensive.
Most position coaches are assigned to at least evaluate all of the players at his
position that will be attending the Senior Bowl. Generally, the club will
compile a "point of attack" or skills overview video that the coach will be
responsible for reviewing prior to attending Senior Bowl practices. From
these films, the coach responsible for the evaluation will prepare a preliminary
evaluation as well as a list of interview questions to be presented to the
prospect. This group of prospect evaluations will likely expand by ten or more
for the NFL Combine, which takes place in late February. 153 After the NFL
Combine, NFL coaches will engage in more in-depth film review of prospects
at their position and attend on-campus workouts of preferred prospects during
March and April leading up to the NFL Draft.
Concurrent with the evaluation of draft eligible players, NFL coaching
staffs evaluate the club's current players at the coaches' positions whether the
players are scheduled to be free agents or not. Hours of film are reviewed
again and the coach typically provides a written and oral evaluation of his
players' performance and potential to the coaching staff as a whole, the
scouting department, and the front office. Once these internal evaluations are
completed, coaches are charged with evaluating the League's upcoming free
agents at the positions they coach. Evaluations for the most productive and
potentially sought after free agents begin first. These free agent evaluations
may continue up to the NFL Draft and thereafter depending upon the club's
perceived roster needs. In 2010, there will be a somewhat limited free agent
market as the thresholds for qualifying for free agency has been increased as
part of the uncapped League Year. 154 Some two hundred players who had
153. See NFL Scouting Combine Information, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/combine (last
visited Apr. 1, 2010).
154. Andrew Brandt, A PrecariousState for NFL Players, NATIONALFOOTBALLPOST.COM, Jan.
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expected to reach unrestricted free agency after completion of their fourth year
of credited service now will be restricted free agents, with their rights tied to
their former club because of a provision in the expiring CBA, which raised the
155
threshold for free agency from four to six years in the uncapped year.
League Year 2011, however, has the potential to include a large free agent
class if a new CBA provides for free agency consistent with the pre-2010
56
League Year requirements. 1
Following the NFL Draft, an NFL coaching staff s direct interaction with
the club's players increases.
The coaches script and execute practice
schedules for mini-camps and off-season training activities (i.e., un-padded
skill intensive sessions). Film study with players and off-field coaching
sessions complement the coaches' on-field efforts. These post-draft activities
continue into June. 157 Since most clubs begin training camp on or about
fifteen days prior to the first pre-season game, NFL coaches enjoy a few
weeks off in late June and early July. 158 With the important exception of the
club's strength coaches, most of the coaching staff's off-season duties do not
include direct interaction with the club's players until May, thus there is no
shortage of critical and time intensive off-season duties for NFL coaches that
extend well into the new League Year.
Based on the foregoing, depending on the timing of a potential lockout
situation, coaches would still have important evaluative work to complete.
The franchise that used its intellectual and evaluative assets effectively might
gain a decided advantage over teams that either cut the compensation of or
outright terminate its coaches in the event of a work stoppage. This runs
counter-intuitive to former Packer executive Andrew Brandt's report that,
"[t]eams are at least preparing as if there will be no football in 2011, with
adjustments to assistant coaches' contracts in 2011 that call for pay reductions
of anywhere from 25 to 50 percent and even rights to terminate in the event of
' 159
a lockout with 30-60 days notice."
4, 2010, http://www.nationalfootballpost.com/A-precarious-state-for-NFL-players.html.
155. Id.
156. NFL CBA Restricted Free Agency is available to players with three or more Accrued
Seasons. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 1,at art. XIX § 2(a). Unrestricted Free Agency is
available to players with four or more Accrued Seasons. Id. § 1(a). An Accrued Season is earned for
each League Year during which the player is on the club's fifty-three-man roster for six or more
regular season games. Id. at art. I, § 2(n).
157. See Lori Nickel, Running Into Time Constraints; School First, NFL Second for Sutton,
JSONLINE.COM, May 4, 2009, http://www.jsonline.com/sports/packers/44334072.html.
158. See 2009 NFL Training Camp Reporting Dates, NFL.coM, http://www.nfl.com/trainingcam
p/story?id=09000d5d81102c35&template=without-video-with-comments&confirm=true (last visited
Apr. 1, 2010).
159. Andrew Brandt, Frustration Continues on NFL Labor Front, NATIONALFOOTBALLPOST.

2010]

WORK STOPPAGE IN THE NFL

C. Alternative FootballEmployment Limited
Unfortunately for NFL coaches, a work stoppage will likely begin at a
time when few other jobs will be available in the football business. Most
college and professional coaching positions become available and are filled in
a two to three month window beginning in December. 160 Similarly, the
availability of most broadcast or color analyst positions will be scarce if the
NFL is not playing games; the coverage of the sport will dramatically
decrease. Generally, the market for coach-related skills will likely provide
relatively low wages, as the market needs will be low and the supply of
workers high.
The most obvious substitute employers, colleges and universities that are
football-playing members of the National Collegiate Athletic Association
(NCAA), are not a realistic option for most coaches. The NCAA limits the
number of coaches on a college staff. 161 In the Football Bowl Subdivision of
the NCAA (commonly known as Division I), a university may employ one
head coach, nine assistant coaches, and two graduate assistants. 162 NCAA
members in the Football Championship Subdivision (formerly known as
Division IAA) are limited to eleven total coaches.163 In addition to these
limitations, NCAA Bylaws dramatically limit permissible consulting activities
available to a coach outside the designated staff.
11.7.1.1.1.4 Use of Outside Consultants. An institution may
use or arrange for a temporary consultant to provide in-service
training for the coaching staff, but no interaction with studentathletes is permitted unless the individual is counted against
the applicable coaching limits. An outside consultant may not
be involved in any on- or off-field or on- or off-court coaching
activities (e.g., attending practices and meetings involving
coaching activities, formulating game plans, analyzing video
involving the institution's or opponent's team) without
counting the consultant in the coaching limitations in that

COM, Feb. 3, 2010, http://www.nationalfootballpost.corn/Frustration-continues-on-NFL-labor-front.
html.
160. There may be a limited number of professional coaching positions available in the spring
and early summer in the Canadian Football League, the United Football League, and the Arena
Football League.
161.

NAT'L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, OPERATING BYLAW art. 11.7, reprinted in 2009-10

NCAA DIVIsION I MANUAL 53-60 (2009) [hereinafter NCAA MANUAL].
162. Id. at 54.
163. Id. at 55.
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sport. (Adopted: 1/10/92, Revised: 3/10/04)164
Substitute employment for NFL coaches in any industry is likely to be
Even potentially lucrative player development consulting
limited.
opportunities, i.e. athlete training, would be limited with the possibility of
NFL employment for these college players in limbo. Understandably, the
most sought-after employers will be skittish about hiring any employee that is
likely to return to their previous profession at any time.
IV. CONTRACT CONSIDERATIONS

A. Prevailing Terms
NFL assistant coaches' contracts typically provide for a term of two or
three years. Thus, many NFL assistant coaches are currently or will soon be
negotiating the work stoppage provisions in their new contracts. 165 The
contract treatment of coaches in the event of a work stoppage runs a wide
gamut. Such treatment includes coach-friendly contracts that are either silent
regarding a work stoppage or impose no penalty in conjunction therewith, as
reportedly provided to the coaching staffs of the Baltimore Ravens and
Cincinnati Bengals.1 66 At the other end of the spectrum is at least one club,
the San Francisco 49ers, which has attempted to impose termination rights
immediately upon the start of a work stoppage. 167 Presumably, such
termination would be without pay or any continued obligation or
consideration, akin to a termination for cause.
NFLCA Executive Director Larry Kennan reports several other examples
of NFL assistant coaches' contracts addressing the effect of a work stoppage
on the coaches' compensation, continued employment, or both: (1) the Denver
168
Broncos's contracts guarantee its coaches fifty percent of their base salary;
(2) Tampa Bay Buccaneers's contracts provide for a twenty-five percent base
pay reduction immediately upon the occurrence of the work stoppage, which
may increase to a fifty percent reduction after ninety days. 169 After a work
stoppage lasting ninety days or more, the Buccaneers's assistant coaches may
be terminated; 170 (3) the Arizona Cardinals provide their coaches four full
164. Id. a 54.
165. Interview with Larry Kennan, NFLCA Executive Director (Feb. 9, 2010).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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weeks of pay, thereafter the contracts impose a thirty-five percent base pay
reduction for the duration of the work stoppage; 17 1 (4) the Minnesota
Vikings's assistant coaches' contracts provide a grace period of full
compensation for the first ninety days of the work stoppage.1 72 For the next
ninety days, the Vikings' coaches' compensation may be reduced by seventy1 73
five percent, and at the end of 180 days, these coaches may be terminated;
(5) the Chicago Bears assistant coaches' contracts provide for the reduction of
base salary by twenty-five percent coupled with the right to terminate upon
sixty days notice; 174 and (6) the New York Jets can impose a twenty-five
percent base salary reduction immediately in the event of a lockout. 175 If the
lockout reaches ninety days in duration, the club has the option to reduce a
coach's base compensation by fifty percent or terminate him; 176 and (7) the
New York Giants guarantee their assistant coaches six months of base
salary. 177
A more detailed examination of these work stoppage provisions reveals
their reach and substance. For example, one recently executed assistant coach
contract reviewed defines a work stoppage to include player strikes,
management lockouts, and traditional force majeure events such as acts of
God, war, and terrorist attacks. 178 This definition is expanded, however, by a
clause that further defines a work stoppage to include any cause beyond the
reasonable control of the club that results in the cessation of the club's normal
football activities, as determined by ownership, in its sole discretion. 179 At
the time of a work stoppage, the club may reduce the coach's salary
immediately by up to fifty percent. 180 When the work stoppage concludes and
normal football activities resume, as determined by the8 1club, the coach's salary
is immediately returned to the nominal contract rate. 1
The length of a work stoppage portends further consequences pursuant to
this work stoppage provision. If the work stoppage causes the cancellation of
eight or more regular season games, the club maintains the option to extend

171.

Id.

172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. ASSISTANT COACH'S CONTRACT (Feb. 2010) (on file with author).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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the contract for another contract year at the same salary as the last year of the
contract. 182 Finally, if the work stoppage continues for a period of more than
six months, the club has the option to terminate the contract. 183 So, although
this provision does not require any changes to the coach's contract upon a
work stoppage, it has the potential to limit the contract's minimum benefits to
six months of employment at half salary. 184 Conspicuously present in this
contract's provisions is the treatment of a work stoppage termination the same
as a for cause termination; the club will pay the coach through the date of the
Notice of Termination and maintain no further financial obligations
thereafter. 185
The absence of tolling provisions in these contracts is striking. Rather
than tolling the remaining years of a given coach's contract in the event of a
work stoppage, these provisions give the franchise the right to merely
terminate a coach. 186 Since if a lockout were to occur it would be within the
sole control of the NFL owners, a question may arise as to whether these kinds
of clauses might be invalid as lacking mutuality or as contracts of adhesion
under varying state law.
B. Negotiation Considerations
In anticipation of a work stoppage, NFL coaches-primarily assistant
coaches that are much more likely to have to address this issue-would be
wise to immediately recognize the economics of their relative costs and
benefits and negotiate for, or better understand and account for, their
contract's termination provisions and rights to supplemental income
opportunities.
1. Cost/Benefit Analysis.
The World Champion New Orleans Saints and their Super Bowl opponent,
the Indianapolis Colts, 18 7 represent, in terms of number, fairly typical NFL
coaching staffs. Including Head Coach Sean Payton and the Saints two
1 88
strength coaches, the Saints maintain a staff of twenty-one coaches.
182. Jd.
183. Id.
184. See id.
185. Id.
186. See id.
187. Super Bowl XLIV Information, NFL.COM, http://www.nfl.com/superbowl/44 (last visited
Apr. 1, 2010).
188. New Orleans Saints Coaching Roster, NEWORLEANSSAINTS.COM, http://www.neworleans
saints.comlTeam/Coaches.aspx (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
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Including Head Coach Jim Caldwell and two strength coaches, the Colts
Presently, the average annual base
maintain a staff of nineteen. 189
compensation for an NFL assistant coach is $350,000.190 Most NFL head
coaches are not required to accept work stoppage provisions that may reduce
their compensation.' 91 Therefore, a fair estimate of the average total annual
salary savings provided by terminating an entire NFL staff of assistant coaches
is less than $7 million (nineteen assistant coaches x $350,000 annual salary =
$6,650,000). 192 This salary savings equates to approximately five percent of
the NFL's adjusted 2009 per club salary cap of $128 million. 193 Since it is
highly likely that the duration of any work stoppage would continue for much
less than a full year, if at all, a better estimate of the per club cost of paying
assistant coaches their full salaries during a lockout is approximately $1-2
million. This is a relatively small price to pay to secure the performance and
morale of the club's coaching staff, the first and primary contact for players
returning to the club. The reduction in NFL player benefits costs in the 2010
million, would likely cover each
uncapped year alone, reportedly about $10
94
1
year.
entire
an
for
payroll
club's coaches'
2. Key Contract Terms.
a. Remove or Limit Termination
Every coach should attempt to eliminate a work stoppage as a trigger for
termination. While this may be a relatively easy exercise for head coaches, it
becomes considerably more difficult for coaches with less experience and
market value, hence less negotiating leverage. If the complete removal of
work stoppage as a termination trigger is not feasible, extending the grace
period prior to termination becomes critical. Again, tolling a coach's contract
189. Indianapolis Colts Coaching Roster, COLTS.COM, http://www.colts.com/sub.cfmpage=co
aches (last visited Feb. 27, 2010).
190. Interview with Larry Kennan, supra note 165.
191. Interview with Gary Uberstine, Agent with Premier Sports Management (Feb. 2010). Mr.
Uberstine represents several NFL coaches including Seattle Seahawks Head Coach Pete Carroll.
192. In 2009, the per club salary cap was approximately $128 million. Final Adjustment
Increases Salary Cap, ESPN.COM, May 15, 2009, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=416959

0.
193. Jarrett Bell, There's No Cap on Questions, USA TODAY, Mar. 3, 2010, at 2C.
194. Id. In an uncapped year, no NFL club shall have an obligation to contribute to certain
player benefit programs including the Second Career Savings Plan, the Player Annuity Program, the
Severance Pay Plan, the NFL Player's Supplemental Disability Plan, the Health Reimbursement
Accounting, the NFL Player Benefits Committee, the Worker's Compensation Time Offset Fund, the
Performance Base Pay, and the Tuition Assistance Plan. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, supra note 1, at
art. XLVI, § 6.
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may be a valuable second option here too. Obviously, the longer the grace
period the better. A work stoppage during the first two or three months of the
League Year should start the grace period to run or result in a salary reduction.
Rationale: As a starting point, the removal of a club's right to terminate a
coach as a result of a work stoppage is critically important. As a practical
matter, unless a coach maintains a current and marketable non-coaching skill
set, there are not likely to be many employment opportunities available in
today's economy that compensate the coach even at the level of fifty percent
of his NFL coach contract salary. Moreover, although federal law protects the
health care benefits of recently unemployed workers for a period of time, the
costs of securing these benefits can be extraordinarily high. 195
Less experienced coaches earning commensurately less compensation
necessarily generate less savings as a result of their termination. Such savings
will be further reduced by the club's administrative costs related to the
termination including the costs of hiring the terminated coach's replacement
after the work stoppage ends and increased unemployment insurance
payments. Whether the players are present at the club's facility or not, the
coaching staff handles a full slate of duties at least through the end of April.
b. Rights of Publicity
NFL coaching contracts routinely include rights of publicity provisions
that assign the coach's right to use his name, likeness, photograph, voice,
signature, biographical information, etc., to the club. 196 These provisions are
qualified; however, in the circumstances where the club provides prior written
consent. 197 Clubs frequently coordinate their players' participation in the
commercial or promotional activities of their sponsors, and players are often
paid for such participation. Obviously, the players will not be representing the
clubs at these activities during a lockout. It makes sense for coaches to offer
their services in this regard as consideration for (1) eliminating a work
stoppage as a for cause termination trigger; (2) limited or no reduction in the
coach's base salary; or (3) direct payment from the sponsor. The increased
exposure of the club's coaches at promotional, corporate, civic, and charitable
activities inserts League ambassadors in the club's community at a time when
they may be most needed. The marketing departments of NFL clubs are well
equipped to leverage the use of the club's coaches. Elevating the profile of a

195. See DOL.Gov, http://www.dol.gov/dol/topic/health-plans/cobra.htm (last visited Apr. 1,
2010), for information about the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reallocation Act (COBRA).
196. Lattinville & Boland, supra note 93, at 153.

197. Id.
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coaching staff expands the club's reach within its community, a benefit that
will continue when the players return.
It is important to note that an appropriate license or permission from NFL
Properties, the NFL's licensing arm, will be required to the extent the coaches'
198
participation involves the public use of the League's trademarks and logos.
c. Reassignment Provisions
A temporary reassignment provision may be a worthy consideration for an
NFL coach. Although these provisions are generally avoided in college
coaching contracts, they make sense in the context of a work stoppage.
Reassignment provisions give the employer the right to transition a coach into
a front office or other administrative job. 199 Skills learned during the
reassignment could lead to a more well-rounded skill set that rewards
assistants with head coaching or front office positions later in their careers.
There is successful precedent for the cultivation of administrative skills;
consider, for example, former Giants, Jets, and Patriots' Head Coach and
current Miami Dolphins' President Bill Parcells, 200 former NFL Offensive
Line Coach and current Raiders' Personnel Director Keith Rowen, 20 1 and
former Green Bay Packers' and Seattle Seahawks' Head Coach and current
Cleveland Browns' General Manager Mike Holmgren. 20 2 Care should be
taken in limiting the reassignment rights to a period of work stoppage and to
certain higher-level functions. A blanket reassignment right could endanger a
coach's role during the NFL season or could subject a coach to tasks not
commensurate with his skills and experiences.
A reassignment may be critically important for those coaches working for
a club that participates in the NFL's Pension Plan (Plan). The Plan provides
20 3
benefits to both coaches and front office employees of member clubs.
198. NFL Properties, Inc. is the NFL's exclusive representative for licensing and protection of
the NFL trademarks, including the name, logos, symbols and other identifying marks, and that of its
member clubs. NFL Properties, Inc. v. BBC Ab., No. D2000-0147 (2000) (Page, Arb.), availableat
http://www.wipo.int/amc/en/domains/decisions/htmlU2000/d2000-0147.html.
199. Athena Yiamouyiannis & Heather Lawrence, Coaches and Employment Contracts,
COACHTNG.USOLYMPICTEAM.COM, http://coaching.usolympicteam.com/coaching/kpub.nsf/v/31feb0
9 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
200. See Bill Parcells Information, MIAMIDOLPHtNS.COM, http://www.miamidolphins.com/
contentlbill-parcells (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
201. Eric Strauss, Keith Rowen Reportedly Joins PersonnelStaff, SILVER AND BLACK REPORT,
May 29, 2008, http://www.sbreport.net/raidernews/008/58.html.
202. See Cleveland Browns Team Front Office, CLEVELANDBROWNS.COM, http://www.clevelan
dbrowns.com/team/frontofficedetail.php?id=321 (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
203. NAT'L FOOTBALL LEAGUE, NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE CLUB EMPLOYEE PENSION
PLAN 1 (1989) [hereinafter EMPLOYEE PENSION PLAN].
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Coaches must log 1000 hours of service between April 1 and March 31 of the
following year in order to earn a year of vesting service. 20 4 Coaches vest in
the Plan pursuant to the following schedule: after three years of vesting
service, 60%; after four years of vesting service, 80%; and full vesting after
five years of vesting service. 20 5 If a coach is terminated, the non-vested
portions of his benefits are forfeited. 20 6 So, continued employment is
important for these coaches covered by the Plan in order to avoid forfeiting
Plan benefits or as a means to earn greater Plan benefits.
d. Voluntary Deferralof Compensation
Consider Suspending 401(k) Plan Deferrals. Generally, it is advisable to
maximize deferral opportunities under a 401(k) plan since income taxes are
deferred on the contributions, as well as earnings thereon, until actual receipt
from the plan in retirement. 20 7 Further, as an added incentive, many 401(k)
plans offer an employer matching contribution that is conditioned on a certain
level of deferrals by eligible employees. 20 8 However, NFL coaches who need
to supplement their savings in preparation for a prolonged work stoppage
should consider whether it makes sense in their particular circumstances to
temporarily suspend their 401(k) plan contributions until the League's labor
issues are resolved, for the following reasons:
1. No guarantee of access to 401(k) plan distributions. First,
by law, 401(k) plan balances (as well as matching
contribution account balances) cannot be distributed earlier
than a plan participant's separation from service, disability,
death, financial hardship, or attainment of age 59,.209 As
explained above, in many cases a coach's employment will
not be formally terminated by a club, at least not at the onset
of a work stoppage. Accordingly, absent a termination of
employment (or voluntary resignation of employment by the
coach), a "separation from service" necessary for the plan's
204. Id. at 1, 6; see Lattinville & Boland, supra note 93, for a summary of the Pension Plan's
features.
205. EMPLOYEE PENSION PLAN, supra note 203, at 8.

206. Id. at 15.
207. In 2010, subject to the terms of an employer's 40 1(k) plan, eligible employees can elect to
defer up to $16,500 (or, if they have attained age 50, or will turn age 50 before the close of the year,
$22,000) of their gross compensation. 26 I.R.C. § 401(k) (2006).
208. See 401(k) Employer Matching Contribution Basics, 401KCENTER.COM, http://401kcentr.
com/design/match.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
209. 26 I.R.C. § 401(k).
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administrator to approve a distribution will not have occurred.
Only a coach who has attained age 59 and whose club's
401(k) plan permits an "in-service" distribution upon
attainment of age 59 is assured of the right to access his
2 10
401 (k) plan balance during a work stoppage.
2. 10% early distribution penalty tax. Even if a coach's
employment is terminated and he becomes entitled to a
distribution of his 401(k) plan benefits, the coach will suffer a
10% penalty tax in addition to ordinary income tax unless he
has attained age 59.5.211

3. Participation in a NQDCP. NFL coaches should also
consider seeking to have their clubs institute a non-qualified
deferred compensation plan or arrangement 2 12 (NQDCP)
under which they could voluntarily defer future salary and
bonuses, either as an alternative or supplement to the 401(k)
or other qualified retirement plan in which they participate. A
NQDCP could serve two important purposes for coaches.
First, deferring under a NQDCP would facilitate setting aside
additional funds in the short-term, on a tax deferred basis.
Unlike a 401(k) plan, the amounts saved under a NQDCP
could be paid to the coach during a work stoppage even if he
remains employed by his club and has not attained age 59 ,
without being subject to the 10% penalty tax associated with
401(k) plans. 2 13 Second, a NQDCP has great utility as a
long-term tool for coaches to achieve financial security in
retirement, particularly in the case of coaches employed by
clubs who are discontinuing their participation in the NFL's
2 14
Pension Plan.

210. § 401(k).
211. See 26 I.R.C. § 72(t) (2010).
212.
For purposes of this discussion, a "nonqualified deferred compensation plan or
arrangement" refers to a plan intended to defer the receipt of income until retirement or termination of
employment other than plan described in Sections 401(a), 401(k), 403(b) or 457(b) of the Code. 26
I.R.C. §§ 401(a), (k), 403(b), 457(b) (2010).
213. See id.
214. The authors understand that nine NFL clubs have ceased contributing to the NFL Pension
Plan, and that more clubs are expected to follow suit. John McClain, Texans to Keep Gibbs Despite
Dispute; 9 NFL Teams Anger Assistants By Opting Out ofPension Plan, CHRON.COM, May 8, 2009,
http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/sports/fb/texansfront/6413906.html.
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4. Ability to save on a pretax basis. To illustrate, consider a
coach who elected to defer $4,000 of his monthly club salary
beginning June 1, 2010. As of May 31, 2011 (logically, the
earliest date for an offensive lockout as explained above), the
coach would have accumulated a $48,000 "rainy day" fund
(ignoring investment earnings on the deferred salary). Absent
a deferral arrangement, a coach in a 40% combined federal,
state, and local income tax bracket would have accumulated
only $28,800 over the same period, net of the cost of current
income taxes (again, ignoring investment earnings on the
saved amounts). While the coach would be subject to taxes
upon receipt of payments under the deferred compensation
arrangement, he would expect to be in a lower tax bracket in
the year of a prolonged work stoppage due to the loss or
reduction of his club salary. 2 15 Further, it is plausible that the

215. Under the current federal income tax rate structure, a coach who is married and filing a
joint return is subject to the following marginal income tax rates for the year ending December 31,
2010:

Taxable Income

Marginal
Tax Rate

Maximum Marginal
Tax Liability

Maximum Aggregate
Tax Liability

0-$16,700

10%

$1,670

$1,670

Over $16,700 $67,900

15%

$7,690

$9,350

Over $67,900 $137,050

25%

$17,288

$36,638

Over 137,050 $208,850

28%

$20,104

$46,742

Over $208,850 $372,950

33%

$54,153

$100,895

Over $372,950

35%

$Unlimited

+ 35% of
$100,895
amount over $372,950

2010 Individual Income Tax Rates, Standard Deductions, Personal Exemptions, and Filing
Thresholds, TAX PoucYCE'rwR.ow ., Oct. 26, 2009, http-//ww,.taxpoticycexter.org/taxfacts/conte
nt/PDF/individual-rates.pdf. Based on the foregoing, a coach earning $350,000 annually will be in
the 33% marginal tax bracket and can expect to pay $93,322 per year in federal income tax. If that
coach earned $150,000 annually, he will be in the 28% marginal tax bracket and can expect to pay
$40,264 per year in federal income tax. The following table shows President Obama's proposed
revised marginal income tax rates that, if approved, would be effective for the year ending December
31, 2011:
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coach would avoid altogether, rather than merely defer,
federal payroll taxes (known as FICA and Medicare taxes) on
2 16
the deferred salary.
In order to obtain the tax advantages described above, the coach's deferral
arrangement must conform to a number of well-entrenched principles of
federal income tax law. These principles would restrict the coach from
deferring taxes on amounts that have already been received, whether actually
or constructively. 2 17 Additionally, with respect to any amount deferred, the
coach could not have any rights to payment by the club that exceeded the
2 18
rights of a general, unsecured creditor of the club.

Taxable Income

Proposed
Marginal
Tax Rate

0-$16,700

10%

Maximum
Marginal
Tax
Liability
$1,670

Maximum Aggregate
Tax Liability

Over $16,700 - $67,900

15%

$7,680

$9,350

Over $67,900 - $137,050

25%

$17,288

$36,638

Over 137,050 - $208,850

28%

$20,104

$46,742

Over $208,850 - $372,950

36%

$59,076

$105,818

Over $372,950

39.6%

$Unlimited

$105,818 + 35% of
amount over $372,950

$1,670

Daniel Gross, War on the Rich? The Bogus GOP Claim That Obama is Trying to Bleed Wealthy
Americans, SLATE, Mar. 5, 2009, http://www.state.comlid/22t3029/, Based upon the foregoing, a
coach earning $350,000 annually will be in the 36% marginal tax bracket and can expect to pay
$97,556 per year in federal income tax. If that coach earned $150,000 annually, he will be in the 28%
marginal tax bracket and can expect to pay the same amount as under the current marginal tax rates.
216. See26I.R.C. §3121(v)(2010).
217. See 26 I.R.C. § 451; Treas. Reg. § 1.446-l(c)(1)(i) (2009); Treas. Reg. § 1.451-1(a), 2(a)
(2009) ("[I]ncome is not constructively received if the taxpayer's control of its receipt is subject to
substantial limitations or restrictions").
218. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 C.B. 174, modified by Rev. Rul. 70-435, 1970-2 C.B. 100. In an
effort to provide added security to employees without forfeiting the beneficial tax treatment with
respect to deferred compensation arrangements, practitioners have developed a mechanism referred to
as a "rabbi trust." David B. Bruckman, Implementing and Exiting Rabbi Trusts, NYSSPCA.ORG,
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajoumal/2003/0303/features/f033403.htm (last visited Apr. 2, 2010).
Generally, rabbi trusts are used as a means of segregating deferred compensation and any earnings on
the deferred compensation from a club's other assets so that management cannot dip into the
contributions and earnings to fund club operations. Id. The trust's assets are available to satisfy
claims of general unsecured creditors if and only if the employer becomes bankrupt or insolvent. Id.
This structure has two consequences. See id. First, there is no current economic benefit conferred to
participants with respect to the trust's assets, thus the participants are not taxed when assets are
transferred to the trust. Id. Second, the employer is treated as the owner of the trust for tax purposes
and must account for any trust income on its tax returns. Id.
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Deferred compensation arrangements became subject to a more
comprehensive set of standards as a result of the addition of Internal Revenue
Code Section 409A, enacted as part of the American Jobs Creation Act of
2004, and generally effective for amounts deferred in years after 2004.219 The
Internal Revenue Service has issued extensive regulations upon which
taxpayers can rely in interpreting Section 409A. 220 The consequences of a
deferred compensation arrangement's failure to conform to Section 409A,
whether in form or in operation, are severe; not only are amounts deferred by
or for the employee accelerated into income (defeating the intended purpose
of the arrangement), but also the employee is subject to a punitive excise
tax. 22 1 Accordingly, it is imperative that any deferral arrangement considered
by a coach and his club employer be structured in a manner that conforms to
Section 409A.
An exhaustive discussion of the traditional principles of deferred
compensation, let alone Section 409A, is beyond the scope and purpose of this
article. Therefore, the discussion below is limited to the most salient
considerations for coaches and their clubs who wish to explore establishing a
deferred compensation arrangement intended to create a financial safety net
for coaches in the event of work stoppage.
i. Timing of Deferral Election.
Generally, an election to defer compensation for services performed
during a taxable year must be made before the beginning of the service
provider's year. 222 There are two exceptions to this general rule. First, in the
year in which an employee first becomes eligible to participate in a deferred
compensation plan, the employee may make a deferral election with respect to
future compensation only. 22 3 The election must be made within thirty days
after initial eligibility. 224 Second, employees may make a deferral election
with respect to performance-based compensation based on services performed
over a period of at least twelve months, so long as the election is made at least
225
six months before the end of the service period.
219. Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 885(d)(1), 118 Stat. 1634 (2004).
220. Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-1 (2009).
221. Amounts deferred under a nonqualified plan that does not conform to Section 409A are
includible in income and subject to an additional tax of 20% as soon as the deferred amounts are no
longer subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. 26 I.R.C. § 409A(a)(1)(B)(i)(II) (2010).
222. 26 I.R.C. § 409A-(a)(4)(B)(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-2(a)(3) (2007).
223. 26 I.R.C. § 409A-(a)(4)(B)(ii); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-2(a)(7)(i) (2007).
224. Id.
225. 26 I.R.C. § 409A-(a)(4)(B)(iii); Treas. Reg. § .409A-2(a) (2007).
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ii. Amount of Deferral.
Unlike 401(k) plans, there is no annual limit on the amount of
compensation that a coach may elect to defer. However, a club may seek to
impose a limit on the amount that its coaches may defer, since the club will
not be able to claim a tax deduction for the compensation deferred until the
year in which it is actually paid to and recognized as income by the coach who
22 6
made the deferral.
iii. Payment of the Deferred Compensation.
Generally, Section 409A prohibits an employee from receiving payments
of deferred compensation until he has retired or otherwise "separated from
service." 22 7 As discussed above, coaches' contracts do not necessarily call for
the termination of a coach's employment upon the occurrence of a work
stoppage. Therefore, absent the right to obtain an "in-service" distribution
under Section 409A, a deferred compensation arrangement could have limited
or no utility to a coach in these circumstances.
Fortunately, Section 409A permits a distribution prior to an employee's
separation from service, but only if the distribution is made "at a specified
time (or pursuant to a fixed schedule) specified under the plan at the time of
The date must be currently
the deferral of such compensation." 22 8
event. 229 The distribution may
a
future
upon
contingent
not
and
ascertainable
be spread over a future period according to a fixed schedule, so long as the
230
As
plan so provides and the schedule is established at the time of deferral.
a result, clubs and coaches may want to consider including in a deferred
compensation plan a fix date by which time the parties reasonably believe any
work stoppage would end, at which time distributions will be made, or include
a fixed schedule pursuant to which distributions will be made.
iv. ERISA "Top Hat" Exemption.
Another consideration of critical importance to the club is that a deferral
arrangement entered into with one or more of its coaches be exempt from
compliance with the federal law governing employer sponsored pension plans,
226. See Kevin E. Murphy, Mark Higgens & Tonya K. Flesher, Concepts In Federal Taxation
G13 (2009).
227. 26 I.R.C. § 409A-(a)(2)(A)(i); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(i)(2) (2007).
228. 26 I.R.C. § 409A-(a)(2)(A)(iv); Treas. Reg. § 1.409A-3(a)(4), (b) (2007).
229. H.R. Rep. No. 108-755, at 730 (2004) (asserting that an employee may not specify the
distribution date as "the date on which my daughter enrolls in college").
230. 26 I.R.C. § 409A-(a)(2)(A)(iv).
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the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended
(ERISA). 23 1 Generally, plans that fall within ERISA's purview require that
contributed amounts effectively be held in trust, with the employee having
received an economic benefit equal to the contributed amount; as a result,
there is no tax benefit to the employee with respect to the contributed amount,
which would be currently taxable. 232 Plans that are "unfunded" and
"maintained by an employer primarily for the purpose of providing deferred
compensation to for a select group of management or highly compensated
employees," commonly known as "top hat" plans, are exempt from ERISA
provided that the plan is registered with the Employee Benefit Security
Administration (EBSA) through an abbreviated filing. 233
While coaches would not likely be considered members of a select group
of management, there is no clear guidance as to whether coaches would be
considered "highly compensated employees" so that their deferred
compensation arrangements would be exempt from ERISA as top hat plans.
ERISA does not define "highly compensated employees" for this purpose, and
the United States Department of Labor (Department) has provided limited
guidance. 2 34 Commentators have suggested that it is doubtful that the
Department would affirmatively identify a group that meets the top-hat
criteria, in part because, since the early years, the Department has avoided
such affirmations, even where one might think the facts strongly suggested a
position fell within the top-hat group. 235 That said, a federal court of appeals
recently determined that a group of employees who, on average, annually
earned five times more than the average income of the employer's employees
as a whole, constituted a group of highly compensated employees for purposes

231. Pub. L. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974).
232. See Sproull v. Comr., 16 T.C. 244 (1951), affdper curiam, 194 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1952).
233. ERISA Section 4(b)(5), 201(2), Op. PWBA Office of Regulations and Interpretations (May
19, 1992), available at http://www.dol.gov/ebsa/programs/ori/advisory92/92-13a.htm.
234. The United States Department of Labor has, in a couple of cases, specified groups that were
not top hat. Op. Dept. of Labor No. 79-75A, 1-2 (Oct. 29, 1979) (emphasis added) (stating that a
secretary does not meet top-hat criteria); Op. Dept. of Labor No. 85-37A, 2 (Oct. 25, 1985) (stating
that 50 out of 750 employees, including "foremen, a superintendent, an assistant in the cost
department, an order department clerk, an expediter, a stepmaster inventory control position and an
insurance position" do not meet top-hat criteria). Immediately after the enactment of ERISA, the
Department of Labor issued a series of rulings wherein the Department determined that the identified
classes constituted a "select group of management or highly compensated employees." Op. Dept. of
Labor No. 75-48, 2 (Dec. 23, 1975); see also, e.g., Op. Dept. of Labor No. 75-63 (July 22, 1975); Op.
Dept. of Labor No. 75-74 (Aug. 1, 1975).
235.

BNA TAX MANAGEMENT PORTFOLIO 385; DEFERRED COMPENSATION ARRANGEMENTS,

A-77 (updated June 8, 2009), citing Op. Dept. of Labor (Unnumbered), 1985 DOL LEXIS 63 (Oct.
22, 1985) (refusing to affirm that a senior vice president of a large trade association meets the top-hat
criteria).
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236
of applying the top-hat exemption.

e. Be Frugal

To NFL assistant coaches working under a contract with a work stoppage
clause, spending less and saving more is important. In anticipation of factors
such as the cessation of regular paychecks, potentially higher capital gains tax

rates in 2011 as part of an overall tax rate increase, and other factors, smart
financial planning should be continued or adopted. Since the mindset of most
coaches is necessarily focused on the development of others, it may be a
unique but clearly necessary exercise for them to consider themselves and
their families first. Basic financial planning and tax savings techniques
warrant the following consideration.
i. Take Deductions in 2010.
In anticipation of lower income in 2011, coaches may try to shift tax
deductions that might normally be taken in 2011 into 2010. For instance,
prepaying the January 1 mortgage payment in late December would allow for

a greater mortgage loan interest deduction in 2010. With a lower expected
income in 2011, deductions become more valuable in 2010.
ii. Lifestyle Choices.
The array of cost cutting measures can be as diverse as the lifestyles of
each of the League's coaches. From limiting the relative luxury of drivethrough coffee or a new car, to seeking the adjustment of child support
obligations, a broad consideration of cost savings measures will be a prudent

exercise.
236. See Alexander v. Brigham and Women's Physicians Organization, Inc., 513 F.3d 37, 46 (1st
Cir. 2008). In Alexander, the employer physician group offered two deferred compensation plans to
all of the group's surgeons, who constituted approximately 30% of group's employee base. Id. at 4041. If a surgeon's net practice income exceeded a pre-determined amount, the surgeon could
contribute a part of the excess to the plans. Id. at 41. If a surgeon's net practice income fell short of
the pre-determined amount, the physician was obligated to the practice for the difference (either out
of pocket or by forfeiting contributions make to the plans). Id. Alexander was terminated and owed
the group money under this formula, which the group satisfied out of Alexander's plan contributions.
Id. Alexander sued, arguing, in part, that the plans violated ERISA's vesting and fiduciary duty
provisions. Id. at 42. Alexander contended that, because the plans were offered to 30% of the
group's employees, the ERISA top-hat exemption did not apply. Id. at 45. The First Circuit rejected
Alexander's arguments and held that, because only a select group of surgeons had net practice
incomes sufficient to contribute to the plans, and those contributing physicians, on average, earned
more than five times the average income of the group's employees, the contributing physicians
constituted "highly compensated employees." Id. at 46. As a result, the plans fell within ERISA's
top-hat exemption. Id.
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f Insurance
Strike insurance, sold through specialty underwriters, is available to cover
lost income as a result of a work stoppage. 237 To be eligible, the beneficiary
cannot be a party to the underlying labor contract but must be directly affected
by it. 238 Although the NFL's coaches qualify for such insurance, the
relatively imminent timing of an NFL work stoppage and the broadly
divergent contract treatment of NFL coaches in that circumstance makes the
acquisition of work stoppage insurance to cover potential lost wages an
impractical solution. The premiums for such insurance would be unreasonably
expensive if such a product were available at all. The premium costs would
likely equal or exceed the cost of the benefits. If the work stoppage never
occurs, the funds used to pay the premiums are not recoverable. So, third
party insurance is not a viable remedy at this time.
VI. CONCLUSION

Conditions are ripe for a work stoppage in the NFL in 2011. The history
of work stoppages in professional sports in the United States, particularly the
NFL, suggests that a lockout is likely to begin at the start of, or close to the
start of, the regular season. The exact duration of the lockout is challenging to
estimate although the opportunity costs of a work stoppage in this eight billion
dollar per year industry weigh heavily in favor of an abbreviated lockout.
There is a limited but important array of contract negotiation keys that can
reduce the impact of the work stoppage on the NFL's coaches.
In the future, clubs and coaches may be more proactive in addressing the
consequences of a work stoppage collectively. Unionization of NFL coaches
is an obvious but impractical, and potentially unavailable, option. A more
effective approach would be the establishment of a self-insurance fund
available to cover lost wages in the event of a work stoppage. Because of the
disparate contract treatment of the NFL's coaches in this circumstance,
funding an insurance pool on a League-wide basis may also be impractical, as
some coaches and clubs may not have a need for such insurance, and some
clubs may not wish to participate.
The most practical and effective way for NFL coaches to concurrently
mitigate lost wages resulting from a work stoppage and supplement retirement
benefits is to negotiate smarter contracts and implement deferred
237. Kenneth J. St. Onge, Broadway and Hollywood Walkouts Raise Interest in Strike Insurance,
2
INSURANCEJOURNAL.CoM, Dec. 7, 2007, http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/national/ 007/12/07
/85489.htm?pint 1.
238. Id.
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compensation arrangements such as those discussed in this Article.
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